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One of the most commonly used two-factor user authentication mechanisms nowadays is
based on smart-card and password. A scheme of this type is called a smart-card-based
password authentication scheme. The core feature of such a scheme is to enforce two-
factor authentication in the sense that the client must have the smart-card and know
the password in order to gain access to the server. In this paper, we scrutinize the
security requirements of this kind of schemes, and propose a new scheme and a generic
construction framework for smart-card-based password authentication. We show that a
secure password based key exchange protocol can be eﬃciently transformed to a smart-
card-based password authentication scheme provided that there exist pseudorandom
functions and target collision resistant hash functions. Our construction appears to be the
ﬁrst one with provable security. In addition, we show that two recently proposed schemes
of this kind are insecure.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Smart-card-based password authentication is one of the most convenient and commonly used two-factor authentication
mechanisms. This technology has been widely deployed in various kinds of authentication applications which include remote
host login, online banking, access control of restricted vaults, activation of security devices, and many more. A smart-card-
based password authentication scheme involves a server S and a client A (with identity IDA ). At ﬁrst, S securely issues a
smart-card to A with the smart-card being personalized with respect to IDA and an initial password. This phase is called
the registration phase and is carried out only once for each client. Later on, A can access S in the login-and-authentication
phase, and this phase can be carried out as many times as needed. However, in this phase, there could have various kinds
of passive and active adversaries in the communication channel between A and S . They can eavesdrop messages and even
modify, remove or insert messages into the channel. The security goal of the scheme in this phase is to ensure mutual
authentication between A and S . In particular, the client is required to both have the smart-card and know the password
in order to carry out the smart-card-based password authentication successfully with server S . In other words, the scheme
should provide two-factor authentication.
There are some other requirements/properties that are desirable in practice. For example, A may want to change password
from time to time. Conventionally, this requires A to interact with S and S has to maintain a password database for its
clients. In this paper, we promote the idea of letting A change the password at will without interacting with or notifying S
(while ensuring two-factor authentication), and also eliminating any password database at the server side. Below are the
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the passwords of its clients. The derived values of the passwords can be obtained by using a password-based KDF (key
derivation function) which takes a password and a known random value called salt and apply a hash function or a block
cipher for a number of iterations (standardized in PKCS [17] and IETF [8]). However, this approach not only introduces
scalability problem to the server but also makes the systems suffer from disastrous loss when the server is compromised
and the password database is stolen by adversaries.
Current systems also suffer from other potential security vulnerabilities. One prominent issue is security against oﬄine
guessing attack (also known as oﬄine dictionary attack). The purpose of oﬄine guessing attack is to compromise a client’s
password through exhaustive search of all possible password values. In a password-based setting, passwords are considered
to be short and human memorizable, and the corresponding password space is so small that an adversary is able to enu-
merate all possible values in the space within some reasonable amount of time. For example, most of the ATM deployments
use PINs (personal identiﬁcation numbers) of only 4 to 6 digits long, so the password space has no more than one million
possible values. Therefore, another security requirement for smart-card-based password authentication is security against
oﬄine guessing attack. In particular, compromising a client’s smart-card should not allow an adversary to launch oﬄine
guessing attack against the client’s password. In practice, the adversary may steal the smart-card and extract all the infor-
mation stored in it through reverse engineering. This notion is reminiscent of password-based authentication protocols [13].
The difference is that for password-based authentication protocols, the focus is on preventing adversaries from getting any
useful information about the password from the transcripts of protocol runs under the assumption that the two communi-
cating parties are not compromised; while for smart-card-based password authentication schemes, we further require that
the client’s password should remain secure even after the client’s smart-card is compromised.
1.1. Our results
In this paper, we contribute on the following three areas:
1. We propose a new set of security requirements for two-factor smart-card-based password mutual authentication. The
new set is a reﬁnement of some previously proposed requirement set, it not only eliminates the redundancies and
ambiguities of the old requirement set, but also facilitates cryptanalysis due to its simpliﬁcation. The new requirement
set also associates with an adversarial model. The separation of requirement set and adversarial capabilities allows us to
establish a systematic approach for constructing and proving secure smart-card-based password authentication schemes.
2. We show that two recently proposed schemes are insecure against their claimed security properties which have also
been captured in the new requirement set.
3. We propose a new two-factor smart-card-based password mutual authentication scheme and also a generic construc-
tion framework. We show that a secure two-factor smart-card-based password mutual authentication scheme can be
constructed by transforming a proven secure one-factor password based mutual authentication protocol (under some
appropriate security model) provided that there exist pseudorandom functions and target collision resistant hash func-
tions. The transformation is very eﬃcient. It only adds several a few hash evaluations and one pseudorandom function
evaluation.
1.2. Paper organization
In Section 2, we review some related work. In Section 3, we propose a new set of desirable properties and an adversarial
model for smart-card-based password authentication and compare them with a recently proposed property set. In Section 4,
we review a scheme proposed by Liao et al. [20] and show that the scheme is insecure against their security claims. The
security analysis of another scheme proposed by Yoon and Yoo [29] is given in Appendix A. In Sections 5, 6 and 7, we
propose a new scheme and also a generic construction framework that can be used to transform a proven secure password-
based authentication protocol to a smart-card-based password authentication scheme. We conclude the paper in Section 8.
2. Related work
Since Lamport [18] introduced a remote user authentication scheme in 1981, there have been many smart-card-based
password authentication schemes proposed (some recent ones are [7,20,28,29]). These schemes are aimed for different
security goals and properties, and noticeably, there is no common set of desirable security properties that has been widely
adopted for the construction of this type of schemes. Although the construction and security analysis of this type of schemes
have a long history, recently proposed schemes are still having various security weaknesses being overlooked, and we can
ﬁnd many of these schemes broken shortly after they were ﬁrst proposed [11,12,24,26,29].
In [20], Liao et al. made an attempt to consolidate a large set of desirable properties for smart-card-based password
authentication schemes. Although we will see later that many of the properties in their proposed set are redundant, the
set indeed comes close to capture the two-factor authentication of smart-card-based password authentication schemes. One
of the properties requires that oﬄine guessing attack should not be feasible even after a client’s smart-card is stolen and
compromised. Their attempt is to enforce the two-factor authentication in the sense that the client must have both the
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that satisﬁes all of their properties. However, we ﬁnd that Scott has a working paper [23] which has a smart-card-based
password “key exchange” protocol that can be extended to provide explicit mutual authentication and satisfy all the prop-
erties given in [20]. Scott’s construction requires some special non-supersingular elliptic curves to defend against oﬄine
guessing attack and may not be suitable for systems where Tate pairing operations are considered to be too expensive or
infeasible to implement. In the next section, we will deﬁne a reﬁned set of properties that not only captures the set of
properties speciﬁed in [20], but also removes redundancies and ambiguities from their property set. We also point out that
the property set proposed in [20] does not capture the exact two-factor authentication that a smart-card-based password
authentication scheme should provide.
Liao et al. also proposed a new scheme in [20] and claimed that the scheme satisﬁes all the security properties speciﬁed
in their paper. However, in this paper, we show that the scheme does not satisfy some of their properties. In particular, we
describe an oﬄine guessing attack to compromise a client’s password once after the client’s smart-card is compromised. We
also show that their scheme may not provide server authentication even their proposed improvement is in place. Details
are given in Section 4. In [29], Yoon and Yoo proposed another scheme. However, we ﬁnd that their scheme is vulnerable
to the oﬄine guessing attack which is similar to the one described in Section 4. Details are given in Appendix A.
Systems using smart-card only. In [25], Shoup and Rubin proposed an extension of Bellare and Rogaway’s model [5] for
three-party key distribution protocols where smart-cards are used to store the long-term keys. In their system, each user is
considered to have a smart-card storing the long-term key of the user. When using the system, the smart-card is attached to
a hosting machine and the machine is communicating with another machine which has another user’s smart-card attached.
The smart-cards are used to prevent adversaries from getting the long-term keys, for example, by compromising the hosting
machines. However, it is assumed in their model that once an adversary has compromised the smart-card of a user, the
adversary has compromised the user. Therefore, the model still falls in the category of one-factor authentication. That is,
once the smart-card is compromised, the adversary can impersonate the corresponding user. In practice, we can do better
than this when smart-cards are used. In this paper, we propose a scheme (and also a construction framework) which do
not allow an adversary to impersonate a user unless both the smart-card and the password of the user are known to the
adversary. In addition, compromising the smart-card does not help the adversary get the password and vice versa. This is
the core feature of two-factor authentication, namely, the user has to show that he has the smart-card and he knows the
password.
Systems using password only. Because of its practicability, password-based authentication (and key exchange) protocols have
been well-studied in the past [1,2,4,10,15]. As discussed above, passwords are of low entropy, therefore, one of the most
important security requirements for this kind of protocols is to resist against password guessing (or dictionary) attacks.
Although it is possible to thwart oﬄine guessing attack, systems using password only are subject to online guessing attack.
In this attack, the adversary simply selects a trial password from the password space and follow the operations honestly ac-
cording to the protocol. The success probability of the adversary is inversely proportional to the size of the dictionary space.
In this paper, we show that by making use of smart-card, we can eﬃciently “upgrade” the security of any proven secure
password based authentication protocol (under some appropriate security model) from password level to cryptographic key
level. Moreover, even if the password is compromised, the upgraded protocol remains secure provided that the smart-card
is not compromised.
3. Security requirements
As introduced in Section 1, there are two phases and one activity in a smart-card-based password authentication system.
The two phases are registration phase and login-and-authentication phase, and the activity is called password-changing activity.
In the registration phase, an authenticated and secure environment is assumed to present, and all parties are assumed to
be honest and perform exactly according to the scheme speciﬁcation. After this phase is completed, the client is said to be
registered. In the login-and-authentication phase, the communication channel between server S and a registered client A is
no longer considered to be secure. Both passive and active adversaries are present and their objective is to compromise the
scheme’s primary security goal, that is, mutual authentication between S and A. During the password-changing activity, a
registered client A can change the password and update the smart-card accordingly without any interaction with S . This
helps alleviate scalability problem and also facilitate user friendliness. In the following, we describe what we want a secure
smart-card-based password authentication scheme to achieve (i.e. security goals and desirable properties) and what the
capabilities of the adversary are (i.e. an adversarial model).
3.1. Desirable properties and adversarial model
Below are the ﬁve desirable properties for a smart-card-based password authentication scheme.
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at the end of the protocol.
2. (Server Authentication) The client is sure that the communicating party is indeed the server S at the end of the protocol.
3. (Server Knows No Password) S should not get any information of the password of a registered client or anything derived
from the password.
4. (Freedom of Password Change) A client’s password can freely be changed by the client without any interaction with
server S . S can be totally unaware of the change of the client’s password.
5. (Short Password) We consider a human-memorizable password to be a value in the password space.
3.1.1. Adversarial model
Consider an adversary A who has the full control of the communication channel between the server S and any of the
registered clients. A can obtain all the messages transmitted between the server S and a registered client; A can also modify
or block transmitting messages; and even make up then send fake messages to any entity in the system while claiming that
the messages are from another entity (i.e. impersonation). To simulate insider attack, that is, the adversary is a malicious
but real client, we also allow A to know the passwords and the information stored in the smart-cards of all the clients
except those of a client who is under attack from A. In addition, we also allow A to either compromise the password or
the smart-card of the client under attack, but not both. However, A is not allowed to compromise S .
In Section 5, we formalize the adversarial model above from a model for one-way password-based authentication due
to Halevi and Krawczyk [10] and a model for mutual authentication (and key exchange) due to Canetti and Krawczyk [6].
We will also see that in general, the adversarial model can be formalized from any appropriate model for password-based
mutual authentication by separating the case when A has known the password of the client (but not the smart-card) and
the case when A has compromised the smart-card of the client (but not the password) into two disjoint cases.
3.1.2. Discussions regarding the desirable properties and adversarial model
One should note that property (3) does not imply property (4). It is always possible to construct a scheme such that the
server does not have any information of a client’s password while the client cannot change the password either once after
registration.
One remark is that in this paper, we do not make assumption on the existence of any special security features supported
by the smart-cards. Instead, we simply consider a smart-card to be a memory card with an embedded micro-processor for
performing required operations speciﬁed in a scheme. As Kocher et al. [16] and Messerges et al. [21] pointed out, all existing
smart-cards cannot prevent the information stored in them from being extracted, for example, by monitoring their power
consumption. Some other reverse engineering techniques are also available for extracting information from smart-cards.
Hence, we put aside any special security features that could be supported by a smart-card, and simply assume that once a
smart-card is stolen by an adversary, all the information stored in it are known to the adversary.
3.2. Comparison with the ten properties proposed by Liao et al.
In [20], Liao et al. proposed a set of requirements for smart-card-based password authentication schemes. In their set,
there are ten requirements (R1–R10) and all of them are claimed to be independent. However, it is easy to see that all
of them have been included in our property set in Section 3.1 except R8, which says “The scheme must be eﬃcient and
practical.” For this issue, it does not seem to be measurable without referring to any other comparable schemes, therefore,
we choose to not list it in our property set. In [20], the authors deﬁne two-factor security in R10, which says “The password
cannot be broken by guessing attack even if the smart-card is lost.” However, this is not the exact deﬁnition of two-factor
security, it fails to capture another aspect of two-factor security, that is, knowing the password alone should not allow the
adversary to compromise the mutual authentication between the client and the server.
4. Oﬄine guessing attack against a smart-card-based password authentication scheme
We now show that the scheme proposed by Liao et al. [20] is insecure with respect to their claimed security proper-
ties, this also implies that their scheme is insecure in the new set of properties and adversarial model deﬁned above. In
Appendix A, we show that another scheme recently proposed by Yoon and Yoo [29] is also insecure.
Here are the notations that we will use for describing Liao et al.’s scheme. Let p be a 1024-bit prime. Let g be a generator
of Z∗p . The server S chooses a secret key x. In [20], the authors did not specify the length of x, however, in order to prevent
brute-force search, we assume x to be a random string of at least 160 bits long. Let h be a hash function (e.g. SHA-256) and
a‖b denote the concatenation of a and b.
Registration phase: Server S issues a smart-card to a client A as follows.
1. A arbitrarily chooses a unique identity IDA and password PWA . PWA is a short password that is appropriate for memo-
rization. A then calculates h(PWA) and sends (IDA,h(PWA)) to S .
2. S calculates B = gh(x‖IDA)+h(PWA) mod p and issues A a smart-card which has (IDA, B, p, g) in it.
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and A (the smart-card) carry out the following steps.
1. A sends a login request to S .
2. On receiving the login request, S calculates B ′′ = gh(x‖IDA)R mod p where R ∈ Z∗p is a random number, and sends h(B ′′)
and R to A.
3. Upon receiving the message from S , A calculates B ′ = (Bg−h(PWA))R mod p and checks if h(B ′′) = h(B ′). If they are not
equal, S is rejected. Otherwise, A calculates C = h(T‖B ′) where T is a timestamp, and sends (IDA,C, T ) to S .
4. Let T ′ be the time when S receives (IDA,C, T ). S validates A using the following steps.
(a) S checks if IDA is in the correct format.3 If it is incorrect, S rejects.
(b) Otherwise, S compares T with T ′ . If T ′ − T ΔT , S rejects, where ΔT is the legal time interval for transmission
delay.
(c) S then computes C ′ = h(T‖B ′′) and checks if C = C ′ . If they are not equal, S rejects. Otherwise, S accepts.
We skip the review of their password-changing activity as it is not needed in our attacks below.
Password-changing activity: To change a password, the client A carries out the following steps.
1. Select a new password PW ′A .
2. Compute Y = gh(PW′A) mod p.
3. Compute β = Bg−h(PWA)Y mod p, where PWA is the original password of A.
4. Replace B with β in the smart-card.
In [20], it is claimed that the scheme above satisﬁes all of their ten properties reviewed in Section 3.2. However, in the
following, we show that the scheme is vulnerable to oﬄine guessing attack once the client’s smart-card is compromised.
4.1. Oﬄine guessing attack
4.1.1. Malicious user oﬄine guessing attack
In [20], the scheme above is claimed to be secure against oﬄine guessing attack even if the client’s smart-card is com-
promised. In the following, we show that this is not true. Suppose client A’s smart-card is compromised by an adversary A.
A can carry out the oﬄine guessing attack as follows.
1. A impersonates A and sends a login request to S .
2. S calculates B ′′ = gh(x‖IDA)R mod p and sends back (h(B ′′), R).
3. A then carries out oﬄine guessing attack by checking if
h(B ′′) = h((Bg−h(PW∗A))R mod p)
for each trial password PW∗A (i.e. A’s guess of PWA ).
Note that after A receives the message from S in step (2), A does not need to provide any response to S and therefore S
does not know whether the communicating party is launching an attack or simply the message sent by S is lost during
transmission. This makes the guessing attack described above diﬃcult to detect. Also notice that if A possesses a past
communication transcript Trans between A and S , A can perform the oﬄine guessing attack directly without interacting
with S . In case the current password is not the old one involved in Trans, by performing this attack, A will retrieve the
current password instead of the old one.
4.1.2. Malicious server oﬄine guessing attack
The scheme is also vulnerable to malicious server oﬄine guessing attack. Since in the registration phase, user A will pass
the value h(PWA) to the server. It is obvious that the server can retrieve PWA easily by performing oﬄine guessing attack.
Although the authors of [20] provided some arguments for this issue, we still believe this is undesirable. It also violates
property (3) in our property set.
4.2. Impersonation attack
The scheme cannot provide server authentication either. An adversary can impersonate the server S by simply replaying
a previously intercepted message (h(B ′′), R). In [20], the authors have already realized this and suggested to thwart this
2 In [20], the authors divide the login-and-authentication phase into two parts: login phase and authentication phase. However, we put them together as
other protocols do in the literature.
3 In [20], the format of identity IDA was not given. We hereby assume that there is some pre-deﬁned format for all the identities used in their system.
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is added improperly, reﬂection attack will work and an adversary can impersonate a client without knowing the client’s
password. Consider the additional timestamp T ′ is added as below in the login-and-authentication phase.
· · ·
2. On receiving the login request, S calculates B ′′ = gh(x‖IDA)R mod p where R ∈ Z∗p is a random number, and sends C ′ =
h(T ′‖B ′′), T ′ and R to A.
· · ·
If T ′ is placed in C ′ as shown above, an adversary A can impersonate A by simply sending IDA,C ′, T ′ back to S in step 3.
5. A new two-factor mutual authentication scheme
In this section, we propose a new two-factor smart-card-based password mutual authentication scheme. We prove its
security and show that it satisﬁes all the properties we described in Section 3. This new scheme can also be considered as
a generic construction framework for two-factor smart-card-based password mutual authentication scheme. It can be used
to transform any password-based mutual authentication protocols to two-factor smart-card-based password mutual authen-
tication protocols. The signiﬁcance of this work is that we can now design provably secure smart-card-based password
authentication schemes in a systematic way by making use of previous results on password-based protocols.
Schemes constructed in this framework may also be chosen to have session keys established, which are generally useful
for target applications.
Overview
In the two-factor security, it is assumed that the password and the smart-card cannot be both compromised. This leaves
three other cases that need to be considered: (1) neither the password nor the smart-card is compromised; (2) the password
is leaked while the smart-card remains secure; (3) the smart-card is compromised but the password remains secure. It is
obvious that security under case (1) can be ensured if security under either case (2) or case (3) is guaranteed. And our goal
is to achieve security under both case (2) and case (3). In other words, compromising one factor should not affect the other.
(A Simple But Limited Two-Factor Authentication Protocol.) If we do not consider properties (3) and (4) deﬁned in Section 3.1,
a secure two-factor authentication protocol can readily be constructed in the following way. Each client shares a long-term
symmetric key K and a password PW with the server S , the server saves all the symmetric keys and passwords in two
different tables, the client uses a smart-card to store the long-term symmetric key and remembers the password in mind.
When the client connects to the server, the client ﬁrst carries out a secure symmetric-key based authentication protocol π1
with S using K , if π1 fails, the authentication also fails, otherwise, the client runs a secure password-based authentication
protocol π2 with S using PW . The authentication is successful if both π1 and π2 succeed. We assume π1 and π2 are
independent.
The above protocol is a trivial solution to two-factor authentication, but it fails to achieve properties (3) and (4) deﬁned
in Section 3.1. Our goal is to design a secure two-factor authentication protocol which not only satisﬁes all the properties
deﬁned in Section 3.1, but also achieves a better performance than the above trivial solution.
Our solution is built systematically by following the steps below.
1. We ﬁrst choose a password-based one-way authentication protocol. For provable security and simplicity, we have chosen
Halevi and Krawczyk’s protocol [10] in this paper. But it is important to notice that one may choose to start with some
other password-based one-way authentication protocol.
2. We then transform the password-based one-way authentication protocol to a password-based mutual authentication
(and key exchange) protocol.
3. Finally, we “upgrade” the protocol to a two-factor smart-card-based password mutual authentication and key exchange
protocol. Notice that the ﬁnal protocol also establishes session keys for securing/authenticating the subsequent commu-
nications of the sessions.
Below are the details.
5.1. A password-based one-way authentication protocol
In [10], Halevi and Krawczyk proposed a password-based one-way authentication protocol and deﬁned a security model
for this type of protocols. Informally, the deﬁnition of security requires that the “best” possible strategy for the adversary
to compromise user authentication is online guessing attack, which can be thwarted in practice by limiting the number of
consecutive authentication failures that each user is allowed. The security model is deﬁned by a game in which players are
client A, server S and adversary A. The game is parameterized by a security parameter k and a public dictionary D which
contains all possible passwords. The game proceeds as follows.
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Set-up phase: S chooses its cryptographic keys and publishes its public keys. A then uniformly4 picks a password PW
from D and gives it to S while keeping it secret from A. A can also register clients with S at any time (before, during,
or after the set-up phase) by picking any pair of identity A′ and password PW ′ (provided that A′ = A and PW ′ ∈ D) and
giving PW ′ to S .
Game running phase: A has full control over all the clients it created, as well as the communication between A and S .
That is, A and S can only communicate through A, every message that A and S send goes to A, and every message they
receive comes from A. A may choose to forward messages faithfully, but may also insert, drop, or modify messages.
A can send special “prompt” messages to the parties at any time, causing them to start new authentication sessions (in
particular, several simultaneous sessions by the same or different parties are possible). Each session will have a unique
session identiﬁer. This game is run until A decides to halt.
Outputs of parties: For capturing the security requirements, A and S will record events related to the security of au-
thentication by giving some special outputs. A outputs a pair (S, sid) whenever it authenticates itself to server S under
session identiﬁer sid. S outputs (A, sid) whenever a successful authentication by A is completed during session sid. If an
attempt to authenticate (alleged) A in session sid fails, S outputs (A, sid,⊥). This is needed so that the “number of failed
authentication attempts” can be counted.
Besides the game above, some terminologies are deﬁned as follows.
– An authentication protocol π is said to be syntactically correct if whenever all the messages between A and S in session
sid are passed unchanged, then S and A output (A, sid) and (S, sid), respectively.
– An event in which S outputs (A, sid) but A has never output a pair (S, sid) is called a successful impersonation (here
we assume that the last message is sent by A and A outputs (S, sid) only after the last message is sent, while S
outputs (A, sid) only after receiving the last message sent by A). An event in which S outputs (A, sid,⊥) is called an
authentication failure. An event in which S outputs a pair (A′, sid) after already outputting some other pair (A′′, sid) in
the past is called a successful replay. (Here A′ and A′′ are arbitrary clients, and sid is the same in both pairs.) All the
events above are referred to as active impersonation attempts.
– An (,m)-run of the game is a run with at most m active impersonation attempts, and A outputs at most  pairs
of (S, sid).5 The adversary A achieves an (,m)-win if in an (,m)-run of the game, there is at least one successful
impersonation or replay event.
Deﬁnition 1. Let (·,·,·) be a positive real function and π a syntactically correct authentication protocol. We say that π
ensures one-way password-based authentication up to  , if for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A, any
ﬁnite dictionary D, any suﬃciently large security parameter k, any polynomial , and any integer m < |D|, we have
Pr
[
(,m)-win
]
 m|D| + (k, ,m)
where the probability is taken over the random coins of S , A and A in an (,m)-run of the game.
The security goal is to have (k, ,m) be a negligible function in k.
Below is the password-based one-way authentication protocol proposed in [10]. ENCPKS denotes a public-key encryption
function under S ’s public key PKS .
1. A sends a request with (A, sid) to S .
2. Upon receipt of the request, S picks a nonce n and sends (S, sid,n) to A.
3. On receiving the reply, A computes c = ENCPKS (PW, A, S, sid,n). A then sends (A, sid, c) to S .
4. Upon receipt of (A, sid, c), S decrypts c and do the veriﬁcation.
A → S : A, sid,
A ← S : S, sid,n,
A → S : A, sid, c = ENCPKS (PW, A, S, sid,n).
It is shown in [10] that the winning probability of the adversary to break the above protocol is bounded by m|D| +m · ·pke
where pke is the upper bound of the advantage of any PPT adversary in the IND-CVA game [10] for public key encryption
4 Security analysis can be extended to the non-uniform case by modifying Deﬁnition 1 accordingly.
5 In the real world, this can be treated as the requirement that A should change the password once every  times of login attempts.
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Next, we transform the protocol above to a password-based mutual authentication and key exchange (PWAKE) protocol.
5.2. A password-based mutual authentication and key exchange (PWAKE) protocol
We ﬁrst describe the PWAKE protocol and then explain how it is transformed from the password-based one-way authen-
tication protocol. Let G be a group of prime order q and g a generator. Let (PKS ,SKS ) and (PK′S ,SK′S ) denote the encryption
and signature key pairs of the server S . User A has a password PWA which is shared with S . Let SIG be a signing algorithm.
The PWAKE protocol is as follows.
A → S : A, sid, gx,
A ← S : S, sid, g y,SIGSK′S
(
S, A, sid, gx, g y
)
,
A → S : A, sid, c = ENCPKS
(
PWA, A, S, sid, g
x, g y
)
.
The session key is calculated as σ = gxy . Here gx and g y also play the role of nonces. If the session key is not needed and
only mutual authentication is required, one can replace gx and g y with two random numbers. The ﬁnal protocol will then
be a password-based mutual authentication protocol.
5.2.1. Security analysis and conversion
The security of the protocol above follows the framework due to Canetti and Krawczyk [6], that allows a mutually
authenticated key exchange protocol to be constructed from two authenticators (as deﬁned in [6]) and one key exchange
protocol which only requires to be secure against passive adversaries (e.g. the plain Diﬃe–Hellman key exchange protocol).
In our protocol above, one authenticator is the Halevi–Krawczyk password-based one-way authentication protocol,6 and
the other authenticator is the signature-based one due to Bellare et al. [3]:
Pi → P j :m, sid,
Pi ← P j :m, sid,N j,
Pi → P j :m, sid,SIGPi (m, sid,N j, P j).
where N j ∈R {0,1}k is a nonce, SIGPi is the signing algorithm of Pi . The signature scheme is assumed to be existentially
unforgeable against chosen message attacks [9].
By following the Canetti–Krawczyk model [6], we compile the plain Diﬃe–Hellman key exchange protocol (which has
been proven to provide session key security against passive adversaries [6]) to a PWAKE protocol, using the Halevi–Krawczyk
password-based one-way authenticator for user authentication and the signature-based authenticator above for server au-
thentication. In other words, our PWAKE protocol is proven secure under the Canetti–Krawczyk model [6] which has
captured simultaneous sessions, interleaving attacks and perfect forward secrecy (for session keys). We refer readers to
the full paper of [6] for details.
In the following, we transform this PWAKE protocol to a two-factor smart-card-based password mutual authentication
and key exchange protocol.
5.3. A two-factor smart-card-based password mutual authentication and key exchange protocol
Notations: Let G, g,q be the group parameters deﬁned as above. Besides the encryption and signature key pairs (PKS ,SKS )
and (PK′S ,SK′S ), the server S also maintains a long-term secret x which is a random string of length k. Let H : {0,1}∗ →
{0,1}k denote a target collision resistant hash function and PRFK : {0,1}k → {0,1}k a pseudorandom function keyed by K .
Also let H ′{0,1}∗ → {0,1}k denote a hash function which preserves the entropy of its input. In our scheme, H ′ takes a
password PW as input, and we may simply generate H ′(PW) by appending suﬃciently many 0’s at the end the password.
Registration phase: Server S issues a smart-card to client A as follows.
1. A arbitrarily chooses a unique identity IDA and sends it to S .
2. S calculates B = PRFx(H(IDA)) ⊕ H ′(PW0) where PW0 is the initial password (e.g. a default password such as a string
of all ‘0’).
3. S issues A a smart-card which contains PKS ,PK′S , IDA, B, p, g,q. In practice, we can “burn” all these parameters except
B in the read-only memory of the smart-card when the smart-card is manufactured.
6 Canetti and Krawczyk were the ﬁrst ones to point out (in Section 5.4 of the full paper of [6]) that the Halevi–Krawczyk password-based one-way
authentication protocol is a password-based authenticator.
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scribed below).
Login-and-authentication phase: A attaches the smart-card to an input device, and then keys PWA . The smart-card retrieves
the value LPWA = B ⊕ H ′(PWA). A (actually performed by the client’s smart-card) and S then use LPWA as the password
to perform the PWAKE protocol.
A → S : A, sid, gxˆ,
A ← S : S, sid, g yˆ,SIGSK′S
(
S, A, sid, gxˆ, g yˆ
)
,
A → S : A, sid, c = ENCPKS
(
LPWA, A, S, sid, g
xˆ, g yˆ
)
.
Password-changing activity: If A wants to change the password, A carries out the following steps.
1. Select a new password PW ′A .
2. Compute Z = B ⊕ H ′(PWA) ⊕ H ′(PW ′A), where PWA is the old password.
3. Replace B with Z in the smart-card.
Remark. The “password” used in the login-and-authentication phase is LPW , instead of the real password PWA . Note that S
can compute the value of LPW once after receiving IDA . Hence it does not violate property (3) (Server Knows No Password)
in Section 3. From the password-changing activity above, it is obvious that the scheme also satisﬁes property (4) (Freedom
of Password Change).
6. Security analysis
The security analysis is done under the framework of Canetti and Krawczyk [6], that is, we should show that our scheme
described in Section 5.3 has the authenticator for server authentication and the authenticator for client authentication, and
also has a key exchange protocol secure against passive adversaries. As inherited from the original PWAKE protocol, it is
obvious that the key exchange protocol is the plain Diﬃe–Hellman key exchange protocol which has been shown secure
against passive adversaries [6]. In addition, the authenticator for server authentication is the signature-based authentica-
tor [3]. Regarding the authenticator for client authentication, however, we need to consider its security under case (2) and
case (3) separately, as explained in the overview (Section 5). Note that this is not needed for server authentication because
the server side authenticator remains unchanged for both of the cases.
For client side authenticator, if we can show that in each of the cases, if the authenticator is a password-based one-way
authentication protocol in the Halevi–Krawczyk security game (reviewed on page 1166), then we can be sure that it is a
secure authenticator [6] (please also refer to footnote 6 on page 1167). Therefore, in the following, we only need to show
that the authenticator is a password-based one-way authentication protocol under the Halevi–Krawczyk security game for
each of the two cases.
Case (2) security. If the smart-card is not compromised (while the password is leaked), our proposed scheme still provides
cryptographic key level protection for mutual authentication. We analyze client authentication in the Halevi–Krawczyk se-
curity game for password-based one-way authentication (page 1166). To mimic this case, and without loss of generality, we
assume that after client A gets the smart-card, she uses the default password without changing it, and the adversary is
given the default password of A. The remaining game is the same as in the Halevi–Krawczyk game.
Lemma 1. If the smart-card is not compromised, PRFK (·) is replaced by an ideal random function RAND(·), and H is a target colli-
sion resistant hash function, then the adversary has only a negligible success probability in the Halevi–Krawczyk security game for
password-based one-way authentication.
Proof. Let Col be the event that A successfully ﬁnds an identity IDB such that IDB = IDA but H(IDB) = H(IDA). If Col
happens, A can successfully get the value of LPWA and thus break the client authentication. However, since H is target
collision resistant, Col happens with only negligible probability tch .
For event Col, that is, the collision above does not happen, the client authentication mechanism is identical to the
Halevi–Krawczyk one-way authentication protocol [10]. Hence for the event Col, the game will proceed in the same way
as the original Halevi–Krawczyk’s one except that LPWA is randomly chosen (as RAND is an ideal random function) from a
potentially larger space {0,1}k .
Hence by combining the winning probability for A for both of the events, the probability of an (,m)-win is bounded by
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[
(,m)-win
] = (1− tch)
(
m
2k
+m ·  · pke
)
+ tch · 1
= m
2k
+m ·  · pke +
(
1−
(
m
2k
+m ·  · pke
))
tch
 m
2k
+m ·  · pke + tch
where the winning bound for event Col is obtained directly from [10]. 
Theorem 1. If the smart-card is not compromised, and PRFK (·) is a pseudorandom function, then the adversary has only a negligible
success probability in the Halevi–Krawczyk security game.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A which has
probability  to win in an (,m)-run of the Halevi–Krawczyk game. We construct another PPT adversary D which breaks
the pseudorandom function.
Adversary D is given access to an oracle O which is either PRFK (·) (with probability 1/2) or an ideal random function
RAND(·) (with probability 1/2). D can adaptively query an arbitrarily chosen string x ∈ {0,1}k to O and get the output
which is either PRFK (x) or a random string uniformly selected from {0,1}k (i.e. RAND(x)). After performing polynomially
many queries, D ﬁnally makes a decision whether the oracle O is the function PRFK (·) or the ideal random function
RAND(·). D wins the game if the decision is correct.
To do this, D runs a simulation of the Halevi–Krawczyk game and plays the role of the server S . Suppose the encryption
and signature key pairs generated by D is (PKS ,SKS ) and (PK′S ,SK′S ). D invokes adversary A in the game. In the registration
phase for client A with identity IDA , D calculates h = H(IDA) and enquiries oracle O with input h. D sets the return value
from O to LPWA and passes it to A (in the form of LPW ⊕ H ′(PW0) where PW0 is a k-bit default value).
D then runs the game until A halts, thus D is in polynomial time. If an (,m)-win occurs in the game, D makes a
decision that the oracle is PRFK (·). Otherwise D chooses the ideal random function RAND as its decision. Then we have
Pr[D wins ]
= Pr[D outputs PRFK |O = PRFK ]Pr[O = PRFK ]
+ Pr[D outputs RAND|O = RAND]Pr[O = RAND]
= 1
2
Pr[D outputs PRFK |O = PRFK ] + 1
2
Pr[D outputs RAND|O = RAND]
= 1
2
Pr[D outputs PRFK |O = PRFK ] + 1
2
(
1− Pr[D outputs PRFK |O = RAND]
)
= 1
2
(
Pr
[
(,m)-win
∣∣O = PRFK ])+ 1
2
(
1− Pr[(,m)-win∣∣O = RAND])
= 1
2
+ 1
2
(
Pr
[
(,m)-win
∣∣O = PRFK ]− Pr[(,m)-win∣∣O = RAND]).
According to Lemma 1,
Pr
[
(,m)-win
∣∣O = RAND] m
2k
+m ·  · pke + tch.
Then we have
Pr[D wins ] 1
2
+ 1
2
(
 − m
2k
−m ·  · pke − tch
)
. 
Case (3) security. If the smart-card is compromised while the password remains secure, there is no security “upgrade” when
compared with the original one-factor password-based mutual authentication protocol (Section 5.2). In the security analysis
below we assume that after client A gets the smart-card, she chooses a random password from the dictionary D and
performs a password changing activity immediately. After that, the value B inside the smart-card is given to the adversary.
The remaining game is the same as in the Halevi–Krawczyk model.
Theorem 2. If the smart-card is compromised but the password remains secure, the proposed scheme provides the same security level
as the original password scheme.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1, suppose we use H ′(PW) = PW‖0k−|PW| where ‖ denotes concatenation and
|PW| denotes the length of PW . Once the smart-card is compromised, then the value B is known to the adversary, hence,
by the equation LPW = B ⊕ (PW‖0k−|PW|), the adversary obtains the last k − |PW| bits of LPW .
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have
Pr
[
(,m)-win
]
 m|D| +m ·  · pke + tch.
And similar to the proof of Theorem 1, if we replace the ideal random function RAND(·) by a pseudo-random function
PRFK (·), we have
Pr
[
(,m)-win
]
 m|D| +m ·  · pke + tch + 2prf − 1,
where prf denotes the upper bound of the winning probability of any PPT adversary in the pseudo-random game. 
7. A generic construction framework
Up to this point, readers may have already realized that a smart-card-based password authentication scheme can read-
ily be built from a proven secure password-based mutual authentication protocol by applying the upgrading technique of
Section 5.3. The resulting scheme will then be secure under a model similar to the security model for the original password-
based protocol, but extended according to the discussions in Section 5.3.
For example, we may choose an eﬃcient password-based mutual authentication (and key exchange) protocol, such as
[14,15], then we “upgrade” it to an eﬃcient smart-card-based password authentication scheme using the technique de-
scribed in Section 5.3. Both of the protocols in [14,15] are proven secure without random oracle, and our upgrading
technique does not rely on random oracle either. The “upgraded” smart-card-based scheme will then be secure with se-
curity statements similar to that of Theorems 1 and 2 (but now in the corresponding model of the original password-based
authentication protocol). We refer readers to [13] for other examples of password-based mutual authentication (and key
exchange) protocols.
7.1. Eﬃciency
The “upgrading” technique proposed in Section 5.3 is very eﬃcient. During the login-and-authentication phase, the
smart-card only needs to carry out one hash function and one exclusive-or operation in addition to the operations incurred
by the underlying password-based protocol. The generic construction framework allows us to choose a password-based
protocol which is eﬃcient enough when implemented on smart-cards.
7.2. A practical issue
In the description above, we consider the server S to maintain one single long-term secret x for communication with all
the clients. As a result, the secrecy of x is utmost important because the security of the entire system essentially relies on
the security of x. In practice, we can alleviate the damage caused to a system by using multiple values of x to partition the
system, and in each partition, a randomly generated x is used by a disjoint set of clients. Each partition is to be handled
by a distinct and independent server. Compromising one server will therefore only affect the security of the corresponding
partition of clients rather than the entire system. Note that this partitioning method does not affect the fulﬁllment of any
of the desirable properties for a secure smart-card based password authentication scheme proposed in Section 3. Another
mechanism which can be used in conjunction with the mechanism above is to set each long-term secret x with a validity
period. Usually, smart-cards are used such that they are valid only for a period of time. Hence for a different period of time,
a fresh long-term secret x can be used.
8. Conclusion
Smart-card-based password authentication is one of the most convenient ways to provide two-factor authentication for
the communication between a client and a server. In this paper, we deﬁned a set of desirable properties for secure smart-
card-based password authentication schemes. We provided evidence to support the need of each of the properties. We
showed that a recently proposed scheme of this type due to Liao et al. [20] does not satisfy some of the properties and some
of their security claims are incorrect. In particular, we showed that their protocol is vulnerable to oﬄine guessing attack
once the client’s smart-card is compromised. Also, we showed that their protocol may not provide server authentication
even the protocol is modiﬁed according to the speciﬁcation of their rectiﬁed protocol. Moreover, we showed that another
scheme proposed recently by Yoon and Yoo is also vulnerable to our oﬄine guessing attack.
We proposed a new two-factor smart-card-based password mutual authentication scheme and showed that it satisﬁes
all the desirable properties speciﬁed in this paper. In addition, we generalize the construction idea of our concrete scheme
to a generic construction framework which allows us to eﬃciently convert a password-based mutual authentication protocol
to a smart-card-based password authentication scheme.
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In [29], Yoon and Yoo presented several attacks against Wu–Chieu [27] and Lee–Lin–Chang [19] smart-card-based pass-
word authentication schemes. They also proposed a new scheme and claimed its security against oﬄine guessing attack. In
the following, we show that their scheme is actually vulnerable to an oﬄine guessing attack similar to the one described in
Section 4. We also show that their scheme does not satisfy another requirement in our property set described in Section 3.
The Yoon–Yoo scheme has the same group setup as that of Liao et al.’s reviewed in Section 4. Let x be the long-term
secret key of the server S . In the following, we review the registration phase and login-and-authentication phase of their
scheme. The login-and-authentication phase also has a session key generated.
Registration phase: S issues a smart-card to a client A as follows.
1. A arbitrarily chooses a unique identity IDA and password PWA . A then sends them to S .
2. S calculates T = h(IDA‖x) mod p and B = T ⊕ PWA . S then issues A a smart-card which has (IDA, B, p, g) in it.
Login-and-authentication phase: A attaches the smart-card to an input device and keys in IDA and PWA . Afterwards, S and
A (the smart-card) carry out the following steps.
1. A extracts T by computing T = B ⊕ PWA , randomly picks c ∈ Z∗p , and computes C1 = gc mod p. A then sends (IDA,C1)
to S .
2. S checks if IDA is in the correct format.7 If not, S rejects. Otherwise, S computes T = h(IDA‖x), randomly pick s ∈ Z∗p ,
and computes sk = Cs1 mod p, C2 = gs mod p and C3 = h(IDA‖T‖sk‖C1). Then S sends (C2,C3) back.
3. A computes sk′ = Cc2 mod p and C ′3 = h(IDA‖T‖sk′‖C1). Then A checks if C ′3 = C3. If they are not equal, S is rejected.
Otherwise, A computes C4 = h(IDA‖T‖sk′‖C2) and sends it to S .
4. Upon receiving C4, S computes C ′4 = h(IDA‖T‖sk‖C2) and checks if C4 = C ′4. If they are equal, S accepts. Otherwise, S
rejects.
A.1. Oﬄine guessing attack
In [29], it is claimed that the scheme is secure against oﬄine guessing attack even if A’s smart-card is compromised. In
the following, we show that this is not true. Suppose an adversary A has compromised A’s smart-card. The following attack
can be carried out by A for ﬁnding out A’s password PWA .
1. A impersonates A by choosing a random value c ∈ Z∗p and then sending (IDA,C1) to S , where C1 = gc mod p.
2. On receiving (IDA,C1), S chooses a random s ∈ Z∗p and computes sk = Cs1 mod p, C2 = gs mod p and C3 =
h(IDA‖T‖sk‖C1). Then S sends (C2,C3) back.
3. A then carries out oﬄine guessing attack by checking if C3 = h(IDA‖B ⊕ PW∗A‖Cc2 mod p‖C1) for each trial password
PW∗A (i.e. A’s guess of PWA ).
A.2. Other problems of the scheme
Besides the oﬄine guessing attack described above, the Yoon–Yoo scheme has some other problems. When referring
to the list the desirable properties in our property set described in Section 3, we notice that the Yoon–Yoo scheme does
not achieve property (3) (Server Knows No Password). This is because in the registration phase, the client A sends the
chosen password to S directly. Also, the length of passwords is not speciﬁed in [29], and the value of B is calculated as
h(ID, x) ⊕ PW , which may be modiﬁed to h(ID, x) ⊕ h(PW).
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